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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

ALLEN-HOWE SPECIALTIES CORP.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

v.
U.S. CONSTRUCTION, INC., a
corporation, JACOBS ENGINEERING
CO., a corporation, and WYOMING
MINERAL CORPORATION, a
corporation,

Case No. 16209

Defendants and Respondents.
I.

WHETHER PLAINTIFF AND U. S.
CONSTRUCTION AGREED TO AN
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION IS A
GENIUNE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT.

Respondents principally rely upon an
satisfaction to sustain the

summa~y

An accord and satisfaction

cannot exist unless, as with other contracts, both
it.

~he

and

iudgment entered in their

(Brief of Respondents at 9-29).

favor.

ac~ord

partie~

assent to

Record now before this Court plainly reveals that whether

there was ever a "meeting of the minds" between plaintiff and U. S.
Construction is a genuine issue of matPrial fact.

The Record

contains the following evidence raising this question of fact
IR<'corrl citations apoear in Brief of Apoellant 27-32):
(1)

On two seoarate occasions, more than a month apart,

nlaintiff's presirlent, William C. Howe, Jr., refused to sign lien
'.'iJ

•ors tenc1erorl to him hv U.S. Construction until they were changer!
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to reflect a partial rather than full waiver.
at

u. s.

When Mr. Howe

arriv~

Construction's office to pick up plaintiff's check, a

u.s.

Construction employee, Patricia Platts, who was herself authorized
to sign checks, presented him with a check and a separate lien
waiver form.

Mr. Howe was supposed to sign the lien waiver in order

to receive the check.

He refused to release all of plaintiff's

claims for additional compensation in exchange for the check.

Mr.

Rowe then changed the lien waiver to reflect only a partial, rather
than a full, waiver.

Ms. Platts accepted the lien waiver as

altered, made a xerox copy of it for Mr. Howe, and then released th!
corresponding check to him.
The checks Mr. Howe received contain standard printed
lien-waiver language on the back.

In this case, in which U. S.

Construction used separate lien waivers, the standard form language
on the back of the checks was redundant.

Recognizing the

redundancy, Mr. Howe, with the permission of an officer of U. S.
Construction's bank, made the

sam~

change on the checks that he han

made on the lien waiver -- that is, changing "full" to "partial."
This procedure was followed in August and again in September.
In their brief, Respondents claim that because they are
relying upon the standard form language printed on the back of U.
Construction's checks rather than the separate lien waivers, the
fart that Mr. Howe

refuse~

to sign the lien waiver forms ann

communicated that refusal to

~1s.

Platts, aU. S. Constructi0n

employee, is irrelevant.

Respondents iqnore the ohvious fact that

the lien waiver forms an,-1

ch"c~c

con~3i'"l

oara''"l lanquaqe

an~
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tha:

Mr. Howe, plaintiff's president, refused to agree to a full lien
waiver, and communicated that refusal to U. S. Construction.
(2)

Plaintiff's president changed the standard form

s.

language on U.

Construction's checks to reflect only a partial

lien waiver three times, each time about a month after the last.

u.

S. Construction should have been aware from its cancelled checks

alone that plaintiff refused to assent to an accord and
satisfaction, yet continueo to release checks to him.
(3)

While U. S. Construction was issuing checks to

plaintiff that supposedly constituted an accord and satisfaction,
plaintiff and U.

s. Construction were negotiating over plaintiff's

claims for adoitional compensation.

Plaintiff sent

u.

S.

Construction invoices and proposals for extra compensation, and
attended meetings with U. S. Construction representatives to discuss
them.

For example, plaintiff, representatives of U. S. Construction

and representatives of Jacobs Engineering (the project engineer) met
on August 22, 1977 to discuss plaintiff's claim for adoitional
compensation; some of the claims related back to the beginning of
the job, well before plaintiff endorsed some of the checks that
Respondents contend amount to an accord and satisfaction.

(R.

237,

ex. D-9; ex. D-10; ex. D-12; ex. D-34; ex. D-35).

On August 18, 1977, plaintiff's president and U. S.
Construction's president had previously met to review plaintiff's
cl~im

in Preparation for the August 22 meeting.

'o7-123).
oa·:~ent

On

SeptPm~er

a claim

ma~P

28,

(R.

238 at

1977, U. S. Construction approved for

hy Plaintiff for

interference from a crane that
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occurred on July 20, 1977.

(R. 237, ex. D-27).

One of the checks

that plaintiff endorsed intervened in time, but was obviously not
reqarded as barring plaintiff's claim.
These facts demonstrate a course of dealing between
plaintiff and U. S. Construction that raises at least a question of
fact about whether the standard form language on

u. s.

Construction's checks was intended by either plaintiff or U.

s.

Construction to create an accord and satisfaction barring
plaintiff's claims for additional compensation.
Two decisions published after Appellant's original brief
was prepared demonstrate that a summary judgment should not have
been granted on the basis of an accord and satisfaction.
McCrimmon, No. 15735 {Utah, 1/23/79), an advertiser sent

In KOVO v.
KOVO

radio

a check with a restrictive endorsement indicating that it was
tendered in full satisfaction of his account.

A

KOVO

representatil''

scratched out the endorsement, called the advertiser to tell him
that the check was being accepted as partial payment only, and that
he could stop payment on it if he insisted on the condition.
thereafter cashed the check.

KOVO

The trial court found as a fact that

there was no accord and satisfaction.

This court affirmed, statinc

Such ~onclusion [that an accord ann satisfaction was
not estahlishen] amolv is suoporten hy KOVO's refusal to accept
the endors,.,ment, ann the failure by [the anvertiser] to stop
pavment simply emphasizes such conclusion.
The

present 'ase is similar.

U.S. Construction that

he

Plaintiff's president told

v.•o,Jld not waivP 'li5 lien rights, anc1 was

nevertheless aiven not one hut three rhe,ks

nv~r

a DPrion of three
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only upon such a condition, it could have refused to give the checks
to plaintiff or stopped payment on them upon learning that plaintiff
would not agree to the condition.

It did neither.

In Fritz v. Marantette, 404 Mich. 329, 273 N.W.2d 425
(1978), a buyer and seller of corn fell into a dispute over whether
$15,282.21 or $24,000 was due the buyer.

The buyer sent a check for

the lesser sum (which he admitted he owed) and placed a restrictive
endorsement on the back reciting full payment.

After some

conversations with the buyer, the seller crossed out the restrictive
endorsement and cashed the check.

The Michigan court affirmed the

trial court's finding that no accord and satisfaction had been
reached:
[I]t is clear that whether a particular set of
facts amounts to an accord and satisfaction is generally a
question of fact for the fact finder. One of the key elements,
which the trier of fact must find to reach the conclusion that
an accord and satisfaction exists, is a "meeting of the minds.•
In the instant case, plaintiff's conduct and the
testimony of the parties presents a question of fact as to
whether the negotiation of the conditioned check constituted an
accord and satisfaction.
Id. at 273 N.W. 2d 427 (emphasis supplied).
The same question of fact -- whether there was a meeting of
the minds with respect to an accord and satisfaction -- is apparent
i~

the Record now before this Court.

~ichigan

fact'Jal

For the same reason that the

court refused to overrule the trial court's finding on this
issue, this Court shouln reverse the summary judgment that

r<?f:JS<Od even t0 recognize the existence of a factual issue.
As an alternative ground, the Michigan court heln that the
'

11

"'a"c1 accord ann satisfaction lacked consideration:
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-s-

Alternatively, the jury could find that the amount
paid represented the undisputed portion of the corn contract.
~he facts indicate that the so-called "dispute" concerned only
the amount to be deducted for damages assertedly suffered
because of the delivery of inferior corn. The defendant
deducted the full amount of the asserted damages and thus the
amount deducted does not represent any compromise or
settlement. The defendant "merely paid what both sides
acknowledged was due." See Gitre, supra, 624, 198 N.W.2d 405,
to support the proposition that payment of the undisputed
eortion of a contract will not support an accord and
satisfaction discharging the balance.
~·

at 427 N.W.2d 428 (emphasis supplied).
The facts upon which the Michigan based its finding of no

consideration are identical to those of the present case.

One part

to a single contract claimed he owed one amount; the other claimed
that more was due.

The contract was, therefore, unliquidated.

debtor paid only what he admitted was due.

T~

The Michigan Supreme

Court ruled exactly as plaintiff urges this Court to rule

that

payment of only the part of a debt that the debtor admits he owes i;
not consideration for an accord and satisfaction.
Apart from the consideration issue, whether plaintiff and
U. S. Construction even had a meeting of the minds with respect to
an accord and satisfaction is subject to grave dispute on the facts
in the Record.

The summary judgment denying plaintiff the

opportunity to have a trier of fact resolve the question was a
serious injustice.
II.

PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER ADDITIONAL
COMPENSATION IN QUASI-CONTRACT.

Responrlents, at paoes 32-34 of their brief, erroneously
assert that because Plaintiff has a subcontract with U. S.
Construction, plaintiff mav not recover in quasi-contract, either
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quantum meruit or for unjust enrichment.

Respondents cite Jaye

Smith Const. v. Bd. of Ed., Granite School Diet., 560 P.2d 320 (Utah
1977) as authority.
Jaye Smith is not at all relevant to plaintiff's
quasi-contractual claims.

In Jaye Smith, a contractor who submitted

a bid on a school building was unsure of the price or availability
of the type of roofing material called for, and therefore enclosed a
note with his bid reserving the right to raise or lower it depending
upon the actual price of the material.
When the formal contract was signed following the school
district's acceptance of the contractor's bid, the contractor failed
to include the contingency in the contract.

The school district

contended that it did not have any knowledge of the contingency
until four to six weeks after the contract was signed.

When the

contractor finally acquired the roofing material, it proved to be
about $3,000 more expensive than he had anticipated.
The contractor was not allowed to pass the additional
expense on to the school district.

The contractor was aware of the

uncertain price of the roofing material before the contract was
entered into, and, despite that awareness, signed a fixed-price
contract with no provision for any increase.

Jaye Smith did not

involve any substantial change in the nature or scope of work done:
it merely involved a $3,000 increase in the cost of roofing material.
In the present case, the nature and extent of the work done
b~ Plaintiff proved to be vastly different than called for under the

suhcontract.

Thera were numerous changes in the project plans and
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specifications: the concrete foundation that had to be in place
before plaintiff could begin work was weeks late: the structural
steel vas not delivered directly to the job site as had been
promised, but was stacked so far away that plaintiff was forced to
employ an otherwise unnecessary crane to load the steel onto a
truck, transport it to the job site and, again with a crane, remove
it from the truck: identifying markings on the steel were
sandblasted away and steel threads were painted over.

Moreover, in

order to prevent the start-up delay from delaying the project, the
project engineer schedulen large amounts of simultaneous work by
many crafts, depriving plaintiff of the opportunity to work without
interference.

(Record citations in Brief of Appellant at 3-4).

In an affidavit, which must be considered as true in
summary iudgment proceedings, plaintiff's president testified that
these factors "substantially changed the nature and scope of
plaintiff's work from that disclosed in [the] drawings and
specifications . . . "

(R. 166-167 at

~13).

This testimony, together

with the very maqnitude of plaintiff's claim, reveals that the
subcontract was, in essence, abandoned ann plaintiff was required t:
do suhstantiallv different work than that contemplated in the
subcontract.

Jaye Smith, the case on which respondents rely,

involved merely a price increase in roofing material, not a
substantial change in the scope or magnitude of the work.
It has long been the rule in Utah that when the work a
contractor actuallv performs turns out to he substantially differe··
than it

appear~>rl

at thl' birlrlinq staqr>, the contractor mav recover ·
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quasi-contract for the extra work.

It is original brief, plaintiff

cited Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 201
(lOth Cir. 1957) and Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 F. 457 (8th Cir.
1900), both applying Utah law, as authority for this rule.

!!! !!!2

Thorn Construction Co., Inc. v. Utah Department of Transportation,
598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979); Richards Contracting Co. v. Fullmer
Brothers, 18 Utah 2d 177, 417 P.2d 755 (1966).
even mention these cases in their brief.

Respondents did not

Respondents' only attempt

to refute plaintiff's claim for quasi-contractual recovery was to
say that quasi-contractual recovery is improper where there is a
written contract.
Respondents' refutation is obviously insufficient.
were written contracts involved in both Wunderlich

There

and~·

Qua3i-contractual recovery was nevertheless allowed because the
extra work performed was beyond the scope of the written contracts,
just as plaintiff's work was beyond the scope of its written
subcontract.
If the work plaintiff actually performed was substantially
different or more extensive than appeared when the subcontract was
executed, plaintiff is entitled to recover in quasi-contract.
Because such recovery is in quasi-contract, the provisions of the
abandoned subcontract have no application.
Whether the work plaintiff did was substantially different
fro~ that contemplated hy the subcontract is, of course, a question

of fact raised in an affidavit filed in this action.

A summary
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judg. . nt against plaintiff based on the contractual defenses is,
therefore, manifestly improper.

As this Court has observed:

A contract with specific terms cannot remain
hypertechnically specific after the parties decide on extras,
which was the case here, in which event another contract in
quasi-contract arises based on a so-called quantum meruit • . .
Richards Contracting Co. v. Fullmer Brothers, 18 Utah 2d 177, 417
'· 2d 755 ( 1966) •
III.

A.

THE SUBCONTRACT DOES NOT
BAR PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR
ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION.

Plaintiff Complied With the Subcontract.

Even if this Court could ignore the affidavit of
plaintiff's president (R. 166-167) and hold that plaintiff mav not
recover in quasi-contract, plaintiff's claims still would not be
barred by the provisions of the subcontract itself.

Respondents

correctly point out, at pages 30-31 of their brief, that the
subcontract provisions purport to require plaintiff to give written
notice of claims for extra work, nelay and interference no later
than five days after the date of the occurrence giving rise to the
claim.
Respondents then erroneouslv argue that plaintiff failed

t

suhmit its claims within five davs of the relevant occurrences.
When making that assertion, Respondents ignored a written proposal
dated August 8,

1977

that plaintiff sent to U.S. Construction,

plaintiff's work was, oerhaps, only half complete.

whe·

(The Record doe

nnt reveal the exact pPrcentaqe of complPtion as of that date.)
That proposal

(R.

amendPd to grant

237,

PX.

pl~int1fF

D-121

requested that the ;-uhcontrilct I>P

an additional

$SS,O~S.15,

$35,173.00 -'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-lC- by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which was the estimated expense of additional work to be done in the
~·

The proposal recites that it is a claim for additional
compensation for the following reasons:
Interference of structures, process equipment, piping,
mechanical, electrical work, materials and workmen with safe and
orderly erection of structural steel, liner panel, and exterior
panels.
Initial delays having to do with concrete pours, material
deliveries, improper base plates, lack of marks on steel, lack
of shims, mud and inadequate backfilling, delays in steel
deliveries and painting, and fabricating errors & corrections
have compounded the problem of interferences, because other
crafts and trades have had to proceed with their work to meet
project requirements.
This proposal constitutes an advance written claim for additional
compensation for all work done after August 8, 1977.
to

wor~

With respect

done after that date, plaintiff complied with the letter of

the contract hy requesting advance approval for the work.
B.

U. S. Construction Waived the Subcontract's
Written-Notice-of-Claims ProviSion.

It is well-established that contractual provisions in
construction contracts requiring written notice of claims for
additional compensation to be made either before the work is done or
within a short term thereafter may be waived.

Rivercliff Co. v.

Linebarger, 223 Ark. lOS, 264 S.W.2d 842, cert. denied, 348 U. S.
834 (1954)

(waiver by subsequent conduct in paying claims for which

·.nitten approval hail not been obtained); Vitra-Spray of Florida,
Inc. v. Gumenick, 144 So.2d 533 (Fla. App. 1962)

(same);~.,

l>.L.R.3r1 620 §§19-27 (1965).
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The Record now before this Court contains evidence of such
a waiver.

On July 20, 1977, a crane operated by the project's

en9ineerin9 firm, Defendant Jacob's Engineering, interfered with
plaintiff's crane, causing plaintiff considerable additional labor
costs.

Plaintiff's first written claim for this interference

was~~

Au9ust 25, 1977, substantially more than five days after the
occurrence.

(R. 237, ex. D-18, D-35, D-36).

Despite plaintiff's

noncompliance with the five-day notice provision, U.S. Construction
paid for the interference.

(R.

237, ex. D-25).

Moreover, representatives of

u.

S. construction and Jacobs

Engineering, at a meeting held on August 22, 1979 for the purpose ci'
reviewing plaintiff's claims, encouraged plaintiff to prepare
documentation of the claims, some of which dated back to the
beginning of the project, for consideration on the merits.
ex. D-18).

(R. 237,'

Four days prior to this meeting, plaintiff's president

had met with U. S. Construction's president for the purpose of
reviewing and revising the claim that plaintiff was planning to
present on August 22.

(R.

238 at 71-80).

There is no suggestion in the Record that at either of
these meetings

~nv

represent~tive

of

u. s. Construction or Jacobs

Engineering told plaintiff that its claims would not he considered
because of noncompliance '"ith the five-nay notice provision.

On t''

contrary, plaintiff was told to suhmit the claim ann su?porting
documentation for

con~i1eration

on the merits.

Plaintiff did so a·

the claims were ultimatalv denied on the merits, without even an
allusion to the five-dav

provisin~.

IR.

23~,

ax.

D-271.
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With this evidence in the Record that Respondents waived
the five-day notice provision of the subcontract, plaintiff's
failure to comply with that provision for the period prior to August
8, 1977 is no basis for sustaining the summary judgment entered
below.

As noted above, plaintiff gave advance notice of its claias

arising after August 8, 1977, and therefore complied with the
five-day provision with respect to the claims that occurred after
that date.
IV.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER
ON PLAINTIFF'S OTHER CLAIMS.

Plaintiff has asserted three causes of action against
Wyoming Mineral (the lessee of the real property) and two against
Jacobs Engineering.

These claims were not argued to the district

court, and Respondents devoted only five pages of the brief to
them.

All depend upon the disputed issues of material fact

previously discussed.
A.

Foreclosure of Mechanic's Lien.

Plaintiff seeks to foreclose its properly perfected
mechanic's lien upon Wyoming Mineral's leasehold interest in the
land.

Respondents contend that plaintiff's lien is limited by the

subcontract price and, in support, cite Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v.
Whitmore, 24 Utah 131, 138, 66 P. 779 (1901).

In Whitmore, the

subcontractor's work was within the scope of its subcontract.

In

the present case, however, there are facts in the Record showing
~~at
:~

plaintiff's subcontract was abandoned hy the substantial change

the nature and scope of plaintiff's work.

c0~tinue

It makes no sense to

the mechanic's lien statute, which gives plaintiff a lien

'·· '""' "•.13lup

0f

th0 sor·.1icco rendererl, labor performed or materials
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furni•hed,• Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-3 (1953), as limiting the lien to
the price of an abandoned subcontract.
Because of the facts in the Record that reveal abandonment
of the 8Ubcontract and would, if proved at trial, allow plaintiff tc
recover in quasi-contract, the present case is unripe for a
determination of plaintiff's mechanic's lien rights at this time.
8.

Interference with Plaintiff's Work.

Respondents assert, at cages 35-36 of. their brief, that
Count V of plaintiff's complaint for Wyoming Mineral's and its agem
Jacobs Engineering's interference with plaintiff's work should have
been dismissed below because

plainti~f

had no contract with Wyoming

Mineral or Jacobs Engineering.
There are facts in the Record establishing that Jacobs
Engineering, the on-site project engineer, interfered with
plaintiff's work by scheduling simultaneous work by numerous craft:
causing plaintiff unexpectedly high labor costs.
84-84).

(R.

240

at

Because Wyoming Mineral assigned all of its rights and

duties under its general contract with

u.

S. Construction to Jacobs

Engineering, including the right to coordinate the work, Jacobs
acted as Wyoming's agent, and Wyoming is therefore liable for
Jacobs'

interference to the same extent as Jacobs itself.

( R.

240,

ex. P-61).
It is now widely recognized that one who intentionally
commits acts that interf.,re with another's pPrformance of a contra:
becomes liable for the interference, unless the acts are privileg•·
We may generalize that any intenrlerl anrl unorivlleqerl
interference which causes loss to either oartv tn a transact!""
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1s actionable by the party suffering the loss. • • • Thus, a~
conduct which is intended to and which, in fact, makes
performance more onerous is, unless privileged, a tort against
the promisor.
Harper, "Interference with Contractual Relations,• 47 Nw. L.Rev.
873, 883 (1953).
1971).

Accord, W. Prosser, Law of Torts S 129 (4th ed.

The quoted language from Professor Harper's article was

expressly approved in Goodall v. Columbia Ventures, Inc., 374
F.Supp. 1324, 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
This Court has approved this cause of action:
In order to establish a right to recover on such a cause of
action the plaintiffs would have to show that the defendants,
without justification, by some wrongful and malicious act,
interfered with the plaintiff's right of contract, and that
actual damage resulted.
3oter v. Wasatch Development Corp., 21 Utah 2d 224, 443 P.2d 663
(1968).

Other cases make it clear that the "wrongful and malicious•

act mentioned in Soter need not be done with actual malice or ill
will:
"Malice" is an element of the tort only to the extent that •the
intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal or social
justification" is malicious; "malice" in this context does not
require "actual malice or ill will."
Aljassim v. SS South Star, 323 F.Supp. 918, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
quoting from Campbell v. Gates, 236 N.Y. 457, 460, 141 N.E. 914, 915
( 19 2 3) .

Professor Prosser agrees that, in this context, malice
simply means the intentional doing of an act known to interfere with
a~other's

contract:

The early cases, with their emphasis upon "malice," regarded
proof of an improper motive as an essential part of the
pla1ntiff's cause of action. As the tort became more firmly
""cta!lli<ohPrl, there was a gradual shift of emphasis, until today
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it is generally agreed that an intentional interference with t~
existing contractual relations of another is prima facie
sufficient for liability, and that the burden of proving that ~
is •justified• rests upon the defendant.
W. Prosser, Law of Torts

~

129 at 942 (4th ed. 1971).

Jacobs

Engineering's intentional choice to cause interference with
plaintiff's work by schedulinq a large volume of simultaneous work
in order to bring the project back on schedule is sufficient
••alice• for purposes of this tort.
Plaintiff may recover for the interference caused by Jacobs
Engineering on another theory as well.

Jacobs Engineering, just as

other professionals such as doctors, accountants and lawyers, oweda
duty to perform its engineering function with reasonable care.
United States for the Use of Los Angeles Testing Laboratory v.
Rogers & Rogers, 161 F.Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
It is clear that privity of contract is not a bar to
recovery for breach of this duty, but extends to all persons who
forseeably be injured by the engineer's breach.
Fox

&

Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974)

supra (architect).

In Rogers

&

m~

Millner v. Elmer

(accountant): Rogers

&

Rogers,

Rogers, supra, an architect was in

charge of supervising a construction project.

The prime contractor,

who was not in privity with the architect, suffered damages as a
result of the architect's failure to perform its supervisory duties
with due care.

The architect's motion for summarv judgment on the

ground, inter alia, that it was not in privity with the injured
contractor was denied.
The Record thus oresents genuine issues of material fact
with respect to plaintiff's claims aoainst Jacohs Engineering anrl
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Wyoming Mineral:

Jacobs Engineering, supervising the project ae

u. s.

Construction,

caused well-documented interference to plaintiff.

(R. 237, ex.

assignee of Wyoming Mineral's contract with

o-34).

Indeed, there are facts in the Record to show that Jacobe

Engineering intentionally chose to cause plaintiff extra
interference and expense in order to make up lost time in the
schedule.

(R. 240 at 84-85).

was interference,

an~,

These factual issues of whether there

if so its cause and effect, preclude

s~ary

judgment on plaintiff's claims against Jacobs Engineering and
Wyoming Mineral.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has shown that important genuine issues of
material fact are present in each of plaintiff's claims.

This Court

shonld remand all of plaintiff's claims to the district court for
trial.
Respectfully

submitte~,

Warren Patten

FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellant
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